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Equine Assisted Growth and Learning Association (“EAGALA”), submits the
following Reply Brief in further support of its appeal.  At issue is Carolina Casualty’s
refusal to provide a defense to a lawsuit brought against EAGALA’s Board of Trustees
under a policy purchased by  EAGALA.  A former employee sued EAGALA’s Board of
Trustees, in the name of EAGALA, without any authority to act on EAGALA’s behalf. 
Nevertheless, Carolina Casualty refused coverage.  
REPLY TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
EAGALA set forth two (2) issues for review in its opening brief:
1) Whether an insurer has a duty to defend is generally found by comparing the
allegations of the complaint to terms of the policy.  Kersten’s Complaint, ostensibly
brought in EAGALA’s name, asserts claims of wrongdoing done both to EAGALA and
Kersten individually.  Given Kersten’s individual claims, did Carolina Casualty properly
deny a defense to the Complaint?
22) When insurance coverage disputes arise and the insurance policy requires the
insurer to investigate whether a claim is valid, Utah case law requires a court to review
extrinsic evidence to decide if a duty to defend exists.  EAGALA insurance policy
requires Carolina Casualty to cover expenses associated with investigating claims brought
against EAGALA’s trustees and directors.  Was the trial court’s refusal to consider
extrinsic evidence proper in this case?
Carolina Casualty, in its response brief, wishes this Court to review “whether the
district court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings . . . .”  Brief of Appellee, p. 1. 
Each of these three issues should lead this Court to the conclusion that Carolina Casualty
had a duty to defend EAGALA under the terms of the policy.  This Court must review the
District Court’s conclusions of law for correctness, meaning that “the appellate court
decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge’s
determination of law.”  State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); Orton v. Carter,
970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).       
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
Carolina Casualty asserts that the underlying lawsuit, the lawsuit that it refused to
defend, was “brought by a disgruntled corporate officer in the name of the corporation
against the other officers and directors alleging multiple causes of action.”  Brief of
Appellee, p. 3.  Greg Kersten was not a “disgruntled corporate officer.”  Rather, Kersten
  References to “Kersten’s Complaint” are to the underlying action that formed the1
basis of this enforcement action.  
3
resigned as CEO of EAGALA and as an EAGALA trustee on March 23, 2005.  R. 123
(Thomas Aff., ¶ 5).  He remained a paid employee of EAGALA. R. 123 (Thomas Aff., ¶
6).  After discovering some questionable business practices, the Board of Trustees for
EAGALA terminated Greg Kersten’s employment on November 16, 2005.  R. 2
(Complaint , ¶ 8); R. 123 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 7).  1
SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT 
The District Court committed a plain error in failing to find a duty to defend.  A
comparison of the allegations in the underlying complaint, to the terms of the policy,
show that Carolina Casualty had a duty to defend.  In the alternative, EAGALA’s policy
allowed the District Court to examine extrinsic evidence in determining Carolina
Casualty’s duty to defend.  That evidence would have shown that the underlying
complaint was one for wrongful termination, and thus covered under the policy.  Finally,
the exclusion relied upon by Carolina Casualty is ambiguous and  must be resolved in
favor of coverage.
4REPLY ARGUMENT
I.  A PLAIN READING OF KERSTEN’S COMPLAINT SHOWS THAT THE
CLAIMS MADE THEREIN WERE COVERED BY THE TERMS OF THE
POLICY.
Carolina Casualty asserts that the District Court’s decision and process was
correct.  Carolina Casualty also asserts that “[n]othing in the record supports an argument
that the court failed to compare the terms of the policy to the claims in the Kersten
complaint.”  Brief of Appellee, p. 5.     
EAGALA’s argument is that a plain reading of Kersten’s Complaint, shows that
the claims made therein should have been covered by the Policy.  Utah law makes clear
that “‘As a general rule, an insurer’s duty to defend is determined by comparing the
language of the insurance policy, with the allegations in the complaint.’”  Fire Insurance
Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, ¶ 21, 27 P.3d 555 (quoting 14 Lee R.
Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 200:18 (3  ed. 1999)).  The “duty tord
defend exists ‘when those allegations, if proved, could result in liability.’”  Nova Cas.
Co., 1999 UT 69 at ¶ 6.  
A court must examine the allegations in the complaint in light of the
applicable provision of the insurance policy to determine if any duty to
defend exists.  Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, ¶ 8, 983
P.2d 575; accord Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, ¶ 50, 98 P.3d 28.  The duty
to defend exists “when those allegations, if proved, could result in liability.” 
Nova Cas. Co., 1999 UT 69 at ¶ 8.
5Green v. State Fire & Casualty Company, 2005 UT App 564, ¶ 19, 127 P.3d 1279.  The
“duty to defend is measured by the nature and kinds of risks covered by the policy and
arises whenever the insurer ascertains facts which give rise to the potential of liability
under the policy.”  Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,
714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986).
The District Court’s decision does not contain any analysis comparing Kersten’s
Complaint against the terms of the policy.  A review of Kersten’s Complaint shows
several allegations against the defendants in that case that should have been covered
under the Policy: 
1)  Providing “false and/or misleading information regarding” Kersten.  R. 131
(Kersten’s Compliant, ¶ 23). 
2)  Trying to undermine Kersten.  R. 131 (Kersten’s Compliant, ¶ 24).
3)  Interfering with Kersten’s duties.  R. 131 (Kersten’s Compliant, ¶ 25). 
4)  Removal of Kersten as President and CEO.  R. 132 (Kersten’s Compliant, ¶
28). 
5)  Interference with Kersten’s access to EAGALA’s money and equipment.  R.
132 (Kersten’s Compliant, ¶ 29). 
6)  Providing false and misleading information regarding Kersten.  R. 133
(Kersten’s Compliant, ¶ 32). 
67)  Depriving Kersten of control of business assets and resources.  R. 133
(Kersten’s Compliant, ¶ 33). 
8)  Damage to Kersten’s reputation and business relations.  R. 134 (Kersten’s
Compliant, ¶¶ 37 & 38). 
9)  Wrongful interference with Kersten’s employment.  R. 135 (Kersten’s
Compliant, ¶ 40).  
These claims are all clearly covered by the policy.  R. 156 & 161.  Carolina
Casualty indeed owed a duty to defend the insureds against these allegations. 
II.  THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S DECISION WAS IN
ERROR.  
As to Kersten’s Complaint, Carolina Casualty asserts that “who brought it, the
authority to bring it, and the actual merits of the litigation are all irrelevant under this
court’s articulated standard for determining coverage and a duty to defend.”  Brief of
Appellee, p. 8.  That assertion is not entirely accurate.  While it is true that the general
rule is to only look at the complaint and the insurance policy, the inquiry does not end
there.  
The Utah Supreme Court, in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen,
makes clear that extrinsic evidence is allowed to show a duty to defend in certain
situations.
7whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine whether an insurer
has a duty to defend an insured turns on the parties’ contractual terms.  If
the parties make the duty to defend dependent on the allegations against the
insured, extrinsic evidence is irrelevant to a determination of whether a duty
to defend exists.  However, if, for example, the parties make the duty to
defend dependent on whether there is actually a “covered claim or suit,”
extrinsic evidence would be relevant to a determination of whether a duty to
defend exists. 
 
Id. at ¶ 25.   Language in a policy that compels an insurer to defend is as follows:   
an insurance policy that described the duty to defend as follows: “At our expense
and with attorneys of our choice, we will defend an insured against any covered
claim or suit.” In such a case, it would be appropriate for the trial court to consider
extrinsic evidence, other wise it would be unable to determine whether the claim or
suit was “covered” by the policy.    
Id. at ¶¶ 23-24 (emphasis in original; internal footnotes and citations omitted).
The language of EAGALA’s policy is not restricted to solely what the complaint
sought to recover and its basis for recovery.  Rather, the policy is drafted in such a
manner that the court must examine extrinsic evidence to “determine whether the claim or
suit was ‘covered’ by the policy.”  Therkelsen, 2001 UT App 48 at ¶ 24.  EAGALA’s
policy explicitly covers insureds for claims made under the policy.  Indeed, the Policy
places a duty upon Carolina Casualty to provide 
[R]easonable and necessary fees, costs and expenses ... resulting solely from
the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of any Claim against the
Insureds ... .
Policy, p. 1 (emphasis in original) (Exhibit “B” attached hereto).  Claims in the policy are
defined as “a written demand for monetary or non-monetary relief, including, but not
8limited to, a civil, criminal, administrative or arbitration proceeding ... .”  Exhibit “B”. 
Thus, a court is allowed to look at extrinsic evidence to determine whether the underlying
suit is a claim covered by the policy. 
Had the District Court allowed extrinsic evidence to be introduced, it would have
shown that Kersten had no authority or right to bring a lawsuit in the name of EAGALA. 
R. 123-124 (Thomas Aff., ¶¶ 12-13, 17 & 19).  Kersten had resigned his position as a
board trustee, and had been terminated as an employee.  R. 123 (Thomas Aff., ¶¶ 5-7). 
He was merely a former employee with an axe to grind.  Thus, the lawsuit was brought by
a terminated employee who had a grievance against the organization, and who used the
litigation to seek redress of those grievances, including wrongful termination and other
personal injury claims.  The court in the underlying litigation ultimately recognized that
the legal action was improperly brought in EAGALA’s name, and dismissed that action. 
R. 124 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 19).
III. THE INVOKED EXCLUSION DOES NOT APPLY AND/OR IS
AMBIGUOUS. 
As noted above, Carolina Casualty asserts that “who brought [the underlying
lawsuit”, the authority to bring it, and the actual merits of the litigation are all irrelevant
under this court’s articulated standard for determining coverage and a duty to defend.” 
Brief of Appellee., p. 8.  Furthermore, Carolina Casualty asserts that “if the policy
9language is not ambiguous, the policy language should be construed according to its plain
and ordinary language.”  Brief of Appellee, p. 10.
The policy language relied upon by Carolina Casualty is ambiguous and should
have been construed in favor of coverage.  
Ambiguity in insurance contracts are interpreted in favor of the insured.
Although we construe insurance contracts using the same interpretive tools
we use to review contracts generally, we have frequently declared that
because insurance contracts are adhesion contracts, they are to be
“construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to
promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance.”
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Versaw, 2004 UT 73, ¶ 24, 99 P.3d 796 (citing United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993)).
Ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract that is fairly
susceptible to different interpretations should be construed in favor of
coverage . . . if an insurance contract has inconsistent provisions, one which
can be construed against coverage and one which can be construed in favor
of coverage, the contract should be construed in favor of coverage.[].
The reason for doing so is clear: “Because insurance policies are intended
for sale to the public, the language in the insurance contract must be
interpreted and construed as an ordinary purchaser of insurance would
understand it.” 
Versaw, 2004 UT 73 at ¶ 25 (citing Sandt, 854 P.2d at 522-523); see also, LDS Hosp. v.
Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) (“any ambiguity or uncertainty in
the language of an insurance policy must be resolved in favor of coverage . . . since the
policy is drawn by the insurer, ambiguities are construed against that party.”). 
10
Carolina Casualty invoked the following exclusion:
The Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in connection
with any Claim made against an Insured:
[]  by, on behalf of, or in the right of the Insured Entity; provided,
however, this exclusion does not apply to any Claim that is a
derivative action brought or maintained on behalf of the Insured
Entity, but only if such Claim is instigated and continued totally
independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance
of, or active participation of, or intervention of any Individual
Insured or the Insured Entity.
R. 163.
The language of the exclusion “by, on behalf of, or in the right of the Insured
Entity” is ambiguous.  There is no definition in the policy of what the language “by, on
behalf of, or in the right of the Insured Entity” means.  Second, there is no definition in
the policy regarding the “who” in relation to the exclusion.  A very broad reading of the
exclusion would mean literally anyone, with no affiliation whatsoever to EAGALA, could
bring a claim purportedly on its behalf, and meet the terms exclusion.  A “one- time”
donor of $5.00 to the organization could bring a claim on behalf of EAGALA and meet
the terms of the exclusion.  A more rational reading of the language would be that the
exclusion narrowly applies only to those who actually have the authority and right to
bring an action by, on behalf of, or in the right of EAGALA.  However, the language is
simply not defined, and therefore ambiguous.  The ambiguity must be resolved in favor of
EAGALA, and construed in favor of coverage.  Versaw, supra.
11
The exclusion must be read in a way that Kersten, as a terminated employee, with
no current affiliation to EAGALA, had no authority or right to bring an action on behalf
of EAGALA.  Thus, the exclusion should not apply, and coverage should extend.  
CONCLUSION
A comparison of the allegations in the underlying complaint, to the terms of the
policy, should have shown that Carolina Casualty owed a duty to defend.  Furthermore,
EAGALA’s policy allows extrinsic evidence to be presented in determining Carolina
Casualty’s duty to defend.  That evidence would have shown that the underlying
complaint was one for wrongful termination and covered under the policy.  Finally, the
exclusion relied upon by Carolina Casualty is ambiguous.  Any ambiguity or uncertainty
in the language of EAGALA’s policy must be resolved in favor of coverage.
This Court should find that coverage lies under the policy, remanding this matter
with a mandate that Carolina Casualty owed EAGALA a duty to defend against Kersten’s
Complaint, and that Carolina Casualty must reimburse EAGALA for the expenses
incurred in defending the Kersten Complaint. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8  day of OCTOBER, 2008.th
by ___________________________
     JAMES L. HARRIS, Jr.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
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